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Abstract
This paper investigates discounted in￿nitely repeated games with
observable actions extended with an extensive form correlation device.
Such games model situations of repeated interaction of many players
who choose their individual actions conditional on both public and
private information. A number of characterizations of the set of sub-
game perfect correlated equilibrium payo⁄s are obtained with the help
of a recursive methodology similar to that developed Abreu, Pearce,
and Stacchetti (1986, 1990). Notwithstanding the convexity of the set
of stage game correlated equilibrium payo⁄s, we show that the set of
subgame perfect correlated equilibrium payo⁄s need not be convex and
may strictly include the set of subgame perfect public randomization
equilibrium payo⁄s.
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This paper investigates discounted in￿nitely repeated n-player games with
observable actions extended with an extensive form correlation device. Such
games capture situations of repeated interaction of many players who choose
their individual actions conditional on both public and private information.
In repeated games with public monitoring, past public histories relevant
to future play are common knowledge at each stage. As a result, such games
have a recursive structure and dynamic programming techniques can be suc-
cessfully employed, with the players￿play at each stage being a Nash equi-
librium of the corresponding one-shot game. Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti
(1986, 1990) provide a general framework for the analysis for this class of
games. Games where players observe private messages only are consider-
ably more di¢ cult to handle since players￿ future play depends on their
private histories. The introduction of communication via publicly observ-
able announcements among players makes private observations public, thus
producing publicly observable history. Kandori and Matsushima (1998) and
Compte (1998) used the dynamic programming approach to prove the Folk
Theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication.
In the present paper, we consider in￿nitely repeated games with pub-
lic monitoring where the players observe correlated private messages at the
beginning of each stage. Following Aumann (1974, 1987), we assume that
private information is generated by an exogenous correlation device. There
are two major ways to add a correlation device to a repeated game: ￿rst, to
add a correlation device acting only once before the beginning of the game,
and second, to add a correlation device acting at the beginning of each stage
of the game. Forges (1985, 1986) called such devices correlated devices and
extensive form correlated devices, respectively, and studied Nash equilibria
of the extended games induced by them. In Forges￿ s setting, there is no need
to study extensive form correlation devices because both types produce the
1same set of equilibrium payo⁄s for two-person undiscounted repeated games
with lack of information on one side when the role of the informed player
consists exclusively of transmitting information. The same phenomenon was
observed by Lehrer (1992) in the context of an undiscounted repeated game
with semi-standard information.
The Nash equilibrium concept is not a satisfactory solution concept for
extensive form games with observable actions because it permits players to
behave irrationally on unreached subgames. In this paper, we explore sub-
game perfect equilibria of in￿nitely repeated games extended with an exten-
sive form correlation device. Since such a device remains active throughout
the game, we assume that players may condition their play on the history of
action pro￿les played in previous stages and the latest private message they
have received from the device. Given a public history, the probability distri-
bution on the product of the players￿message sets, according to which the
device randomly selects private messages to players, is common knowledge.
This is achieved by de￿ning stage k￿ s public history as the realized choices
of actions at all stages before k. It is useful to note that any information
about private messages sent to players in previous stages or about players￿
obedience to the device￿ s past recommendations does not a⁄ect the way ac-
cording to which the device selects its current and future recommendations.
Another important assumption is that the players￿strategies do not depend
on past private messages. This assumption leads to the existence of proper
subgames and the opportunity to utilize the techniques developed by Abreu,
Pearce, Stacchetti (1986, 1990) for studying in￿nitely repeated games with
imperfect monitoring. Thus, the concept of subgame perfect correlated equi-
librium is a combination of the correlated equilibrium concept and that of
subgame perfectness and is closely related to the concept of subgame perfect
publicly correlated equilibrium introduced by Myerson (1991), who studied
in￿nitely repeated games extended with direct public randomization devices
and proved a version of the folk theorem for such games.
2The extensive form correlation devices we consider send players messages
con￿dentially and separately and are not necessarily direct devices. Propo-
sition 1 asserts that, in in￿nitely repeated games, subgame perfect corre-
lated equilibria have a simple intertemporal structure, with the players￿play
at each stage being a correlated equilibrium of the corresponding one-shot
game. An important corollary is that the revelation principle holds for such
games ￿ any subgame perfect correlated equilibrium payo⁄can be achieved
as a subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium payo⁄. Therefore, we
can restrict our attention to studying the recursive structure of in￿nitely
repeated games extended with an extensive form direct correlation device
and characterizing the set of subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium
payo⁄s.
In the spirit of dynamic programming, we decompose an equilibrium into
an admissible pair that consists of a probability distribution on the product
of the players￿action sets and a continuation value function. If the distri-
bution is degenerate, we get an admissible pair in the Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti sense. This generalization has allowed us to obtain a number of
characterizations of the set of subgame perfect correlated equilibrium payo⁄s
similar to those provided by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986, 1990) for
games with imperfect monitoring.
In the last section, we present two prisoner￿ s dilemma games. In Example
1, the set of subgame perfect correlated equilibrium payo⁄s strictly includes
not only the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payo⁄s but also the set
of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payo⁄s. In Example 2,
the set of subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium payo⁄s is not convex,
strictly includes the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payo⁄s, and is strictly
contained in the set of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium
payo⁄s. The latter is possible since, in the presence of a public randomization
device, the history of public messages observed in previous stages is also
common knowledge at the beginning of each stage, which is not the case
3when messages are private. Note that, by the revelation principle, the set
of subgame perfect correlated equilibrium payo⁄s of an in￿nitely repeated
game is not necessarily convex as well.
2 Correlation Devices in Finitely Repeated
Games: An Example
In this section, we show that the de￿nition of correlated equilibrium given
by Aumann (1974, 1987) for normal form games can be readily extended to
repeated games.
Consider the following normal form game G = (N;(Ai)i2N;(ui)i2N), where
N = f1;:::ng is the ￿nite set of players, Ai = f1;:::Iig is player i￿ s ￿nite
set of actions, ui is player i￿ s payo⁄ function from A = ￿
i2N
Ai to the real line
R.
For any ￿nite set X, let 4(X) denote the set of all probability distri-
butions on X. A correlation device D = ((Mi)i2N;￿) consists of a family
of ￿nite message sets Mi; one for each player, and a probability distribu-
tion ￿ on the Cartesian product of these message sets M = ￿
i2N
Mi: When
m = (m1;:::;mn) is randomly drawn according to ￿; player i is informed
about mi: The extended game GD is the game where players are ￿rst privately
informed by the device of their private messages and next play G: A strategy
for player i in the extended game is a map fi from Mi to 4(Ai). Let fi(ai j mi)
denote the probability that player i chooses action ai if the device￿ s private
message to her is mi, uiD(f) denote player i0s expected payo⁄to the strategy










fj(aj j mj)ui(a): A correlation device D = ((Mi)i2N;￿)
and a strategy pro￿le f = (f1;:::fn); fi : Mi ! 4(Ai); induce the following









fj(aj j mj)￿(m); a = (a1;:::;an) 2 A:
It is obvious that uiD(f) =
P
a2A
ui(a)￿D;f(a): A correlated equilibrium (D;f)
is a pair consisting of a correlation device D and a strategy pro￿le f such
that the strategy pro￿le is a Nash equilibrium of the extended game induced
by the device, that is,
uiD(f) ￿ uiD(g;f￿i) for all g : Mi ! 4(Ai) and all i 2 N:
A direct (canonical) correlation device is one where the set of messages
for each player is her action set (Mi = Ai for all i 2 N): We will identify a
direct correlation device D = ((Ai)i2N;￿) with the probability distribution ￿
according to which the device randomly selects private messages for players.
In a game extended with a direct correlation device, a strategy for a player is
a map from her set of actions to itself. The obedient strategy for player i is
the identity map from Ai to Ai: A direct correlated strategy for the players in
G is any probability distribution ￿ 2 4(A). A direct correlated equilibrium
is a direct correlated strategy such that the obedient strategy pro￿le forms
a Nash equilibrium in the extended game induced by the direct correlation
device.
Formally, a direct correlated strategy ￿ is a direct correlated equilibrium
if it satis￿es the following incentive constraints:
X
a￿i2A￿i
￿(a)(ui(a)￿ui(ei;a￿i)) ￿ 0 for all i 2 N; all ai 2 Ai; and all ei 2 Ai;
where A￿i = ￿
j2N￿i
Aj; N ￿ i = fj 2 N : j 6= ig .
According to the revelation principle (Myerson, 1982) for normal form
games, every correlated equilibrium payo⁄ of G can be achieved as a direct
5correlated equilibrium payo⁄of G: Another equivalent version of the principle
is that any distribution ￿D;f 2 4(A) induced by a correlated equilibrium
(D;f) is a direct correlated equilibrium.
As Dhillon and Mertens (1996) have shown, the revelation principle for
normal form games fails if, in the de￿nition of correlated equilibrium, the
Nash equilibrium concept is replaced with its minimal re￿nement, the con-
cept of normal form perfect equilibrium. It has turned out that, unlike the
set of perfect correlated equilibria, the set of perfect direct correlated equi-
libria is not necessarily convex. Hence, the set of perfect direct correlated
equilibria may be a proper subset of the set of perfect correlated equilibrium
distributions.
The basic solution concept we use in this paper is that of subgame per-
fect correlated equilibrium. As it will be shown below, in in￿nitely repeated
games extended with an extensive form correlation device, the set of sub-
game perfect direct correlated equilibrium payo⁄s is not necessarily convex,
however the revelation principle holds for such games.
To provide some intuition with respect to possible ways to de￿ning sub-
game perfect correlated equilibrium strategies, let us assume that the game
G is repeated twice, player i￿ s payo⁄ is given by ui(a0) + ￿ui(a1), where
￿ 2 (0;1), ak is the action pro￿le played at stage k; and the players￿stage 0
choices of actions are observable.
A stage-0 direct correlated strategy is some probability distribution
￿(￿ j h0) 2 4(A), where h0 = f?g is the null history. The correlation
device randomly selects a = (a1;:::;an) 2 A according to ￿(￿ j h0) and
recommends each player i play ai con￿dentially and separately.
A stage-1 direct correlated strategy can be described as a map ￿(￿ j h1)
from the set of all possible stage-1 histories H1 = A to 4(A): We also let
H0 = f?g. At h1 2 H1; the correlation device randomly selects an action
pro￿le according to ￿(￿ j h1) and privately makes the corresponding recom-
mendations to the players. Further on, we will identify an extensive form
6direct correlation device with an extensive form direct correlated strategy.
Thus, an extensive form direct correlated strategy in this twice-repeated
game G2 is a map ￿ from H0 [ H1 to 4(A): Intuitively, a direct correlated
strategy ￿ : H0 [H1 ! 4(A) is a subgame perfect direct correlated equilib-
rium of this twice-repeated game if no player can expect to gain by disobeying
the device￿ s recommendation after any history of play. In other words, at
any stage, the recommendations made by the correlation device should be
incentive compatible. In twice-repeated games, we can employ backward
induction to ensure incentive compatibility. It should be noted that the
problem becomes more complicated in in￿nitely repeated games. The in-
centive compatibility of the device￿ s recommendations at each stage will be
achieved through extending the techiniques developed by Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti (1986, 1990) to in￿nitely repeated games with an extensive form
correlation device.
So, let us write down the system of inequilities ensuring that the device￿ s









￿i;ei)) ￿ 0 for all i 2 N; all a
1
i 2 Ai; all ei 2 Ai:
(1)
Assume that ￿ is common knowledge and these inequalities hold for all
h1 2 H1: Since it is rational for the players to obey the device￿ s recom-





￿(a1 j h1 = fa0g)ui(a1) for any a0 2 A: The device￿ s
recommendations are incentive compatible at stage 0 if ￿(￿ j h0) is a di-
rect correlated equilibrium of the game G = (N;(Ai)i2N;(Ui)i2N), where
Ui(a) = ui(a) + ￿u1
i(a), a 2 A. Thus, an extensive form direct correlated
strategy ￿ : H0 [H1 ! 4(A) is a subgame perfect direct correlated equilib-










i)) ￿ 0 for all i 2 N; all a
0
i 2 Ai; all e
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1) 2 A ￿ A: (2)
Unfortunately, the dynamic structure of this twice-repeated game would
be lost if we tried to de￿ne an extensive form direct correlated equilibrium as
a Nash equilibrium of the game G = (N;(Ai ￿ Ai)i2N;(Ui)i2N);Ui(a0;a1) =
ui(a0)+￿ui(a1); extended with a direct correlation device randomly selecting
its recommendations according to P. The same phenomenon was observed
by Myerson (1986) for general multistage games.
Let us assume that ￿ = 1




Player 1 1 8,8 2,10
2 10,2 0,0
It is not di¢ cult to check that the extensive form correlated strategy




3;0), ￿(￿ j (1;2)) = (0;0;1;0), ￿(￿ j (2;1)) = (0;1;0;0),
￿(￿ j (2;2)) = (1
3; 1
3; 1
3;0) is a subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium
of this twice repeated game since the players have no incentives to disobey
8the mediator￿ s recommendations after any history of play. If each player
has followed the recommendation to choose action 1 at stage 0, the stage-
1 correlation device selects its recommendations according to ￿(￿ j (1;1)),
a direct correlated equilibrium of the stage game that gives each player an
expected discounted payo⁄ of 31
3. If a player deviates at stage 0, she gets
two extra utils, but her discounted expected loss is 21
3 at stage 1. Another
useful observation is that the stage-1 correlated strategies ￿(￿ j (1;2)) and
￿(￿ j (2;1)) form pure Nash equilibria of the stage game. At the same time,
playing the action pro￿le (1;1) at stage 0 is not part of any equilibrium path
in pure or mixed strategies.
It is not di¢ cult to check that, in this twice-repeated game, the direct
correlated strategy P 2 4(A ￿ A) de￿ned by (2) is not a direct correlated
equilibrium of G = (N;(Ai ￿ Ai)i2N;(Ui)i2N), Ui(a0;a1) = ui(a0) + ￿ui(a1);
(a0;a1) 2 A￿A. Thus, studying subgame perfect correlated equilibria of the
twice-repeated game can not be boiled down to studying correlated equilibria
of the normal form game G.
3 Correlation Devices in In￿nitely Repeated
Games
This section presents the basic properties of in￿nitely repeated games ex-
tended with an extensive form correlation device. By an extensive form
correlation device we mean a correlation device that sends separately and
con￿dentially messages to the players at the beginning of each stage. Let
G = (N;(Ai)i2N;(ui)i2N) be the stage game. Suppose that the game begins
at stage 0; with the null history h0 = f?g: At the beginning of stage k, player
i observes the public history of past actions actually chosen by the players
before stage k hk = (a0;:::;ak￿1) and stage k￿ s private recommedation sent
her by the correlation device. If ak = (ak
1;:::;ak
n) is the action pro￿le chosen







where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor common to the players. Let G1(￿)
denote the discounted in￿nitely repeated game with observable actions.
An extensive form correlation device D = ((Mi)i2N;￿) is an (n + 1)-





Hk to 4(M); where Hk = (A)k is the set of all possible stage-
k public histories, M = ￿
i2N
Mi: Let ￿(m = (m1;:::;mn) j hk) denote the
conditional probability that the correlation device would send each player i
message mi if the history of past actions is hk: The extended game G1
D(￿) is
the one where, at the beginning of each stage, players are informed by the
correlation device D of their private messages and next choose their actions.
A strategy for player i is a map fi from H￿Mi to 4(Ai): Here fi(ai j hk;mi)
represents the probability that player i plays action ai at stage k conditional
on hk and mi. Note player i chooses her action at stage k on the basis of
the public information available (hk 2 Hk) and the private message she gets
from the correlation device at the beginning of the stage. For any correlation
device D and strategy pro￿le f = (f1;:::;fn); we can compute the following:
the conditional probability ￿D;f(ak j hk) that the players would choose action














the probability that history hk+1 = fa0;:::;akg has taken place in the ￿rst
k stages
P(h









10the probability that an action pro￿le ak would be implemented at stage k
P
k(a






player i￿ s expected average discounted payo⁄










Having the players￿strategy spaces and payo⁄ functions de￿ned, we can
extend the de￿nition of correlated equlibrium given in the context of nor-
mal form games to in￿nitely repeated games. An extensive form correlated
equilibrium (D;f) of G1(￿) is a pair consisting of an extensive form cor-
relation device D and a strategy pro￿le f such that the strategy pro￿le is
a Nash equilibrium in the extended game induced by the device, that is,
Ui(f j ￿;D) ￿ Ui(g;f￿i j ￿;D) for all g : H ￿ Mi ! 4(Ai) and all i 2 N:
Unfortunately, this de￿nition of extensive form correlated equilibrium
does not deal successfully with di¢ culties that may arise with respect to
unreached subgames. For games in extensive form, Selten (1965, 1975) pro-
posed a number of re￿nements of the Nash equilibrium concept. We will
employ the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium.
Each stage of the game begins a proper subgame that can be studied in
its own. For any correlation device D; strategy pro￿le f, and history hk; we
denote by Djhk the correlation device Djhk = ((Mi)i2N;￿jhk) induced by D in




Hj to M =
￿
i2N
Mi such that ￿jhk(m j hj) = ￿(m j hk+j = fhk;hjg) for all m 2 M and




n ) the strategy pro￿le induced by f in the
subgame starting at hk, where f
jhk
i (ai j hj;mi) = fi(ai j hk+j = fhk;hjg;mi)
for all i 2 N; all mi 2 Mi; and all hj 2 H; by ￿0jhk = ￿jhk(￿ j h0) the probabity
distribution on M according to which the extensive form correlation device
11D = ((Mi)i2N;￿) selects its stage-k recommendations conditional on history
hk being reached: Note that D = Djh0 and f = fjh0:
For any history hk and strategy pro￿le f = (f1;:::;fn); we can compute



















An extensive form correlated equilibrium (D;f) of G1(￿) is called subgame
perfect if (Djhk;fjhk) is an extensive form correlated equilibrium of G1(￿) for
any history hk 2 H:












Owing to the simple intertemporal structure of G1
D, there exists a more
tractable, equivalent de￿nition of a subgame perfect correlated equilibrium
in this game.
Proposition 1. A pair (D;f) consisting of an extensive form correla-
tion device ((Mi)i2N;￿) and a strategy pro￿le f = (f1;:::;fn); fi : H￿Mi !
4(Ai); is a subgame perfect correlated equilibrium of G1(￿) if and only if,
for any history hk 2 H; the correlation device D0jhk = ((Mi)i2N;￿0jhk); and
the strategy pro￿le f0jhk = (f
jhk
1 (￿ j h0);:::; f
jhk
n (￿ j h0)); f
jhk
i (￿ j h0) : Mi !
4(Ai); is a correlated equilibrium of the game
G
0jhk
(￿) = (N;(Ai)i2N;((1 ￿ ￿)ui(￿) + ￿Ui(f
jfhk;￿g j ￿;D
jfhk;￿g)i2N):
Proof. The "only if" part obviously follows from the de￿nition of sub-
game perfect correlated equilibrium.
Let (D;f) be such that (D0jhk;f0jhk) is a correlated equilibrium of the
game G0jhk(￿) for any hk 2 H: Assume, by contradiction, there exists a
12history hk 2 H such that (Djhk;fjhk) is not an extensive form correlated
equilibrium of G1(￿): Then there exist player i; strategy gi : H￿Mi ! 4(Ai)
such that Ui(gi;f
jhk
￿i j ￿;Djhk)) > Ui(fjhk j ￿;Djhk): For any K 2 f0;1;:::g;
de￿ne the following function gK








Hj and all mi 2 Mi;
f
jhk




Hj and all mi 2 Mi:




￿i j ￿;Djhk) > Ui(fjhk j ￿;Djhk): Player i can not gain
by deviating from fi at stage 0 of the game Gjhk+K(￿) and conforming to fi
thereafter because (D0jhk+K;f0jhk+K) is a correlated equilibrium of G0jhk+K(￿)




￿i j ￿;Djhk) > Ui(fjhk j ￿;Djhk):




￿i j ￿;Djhk) > Ui(fjhk j ￿;Djhk); which contradicts to the assumption
that (D0jhk;f0jhk) is a correlated equilibrium of the game G0jhk(￿). ￿
In multi-stage and repeated games, the one-shot deviation principle is an
indispensable tool for verifying that a strategy pro￿le is a subgame perfect
equilibrium. According to this principle, a strategy pro￿le is a subgame
perfect if one-shot deviations are not pro￿table (any player can not gain by
deviating from her strategy in a single stage). It is obvious that Proposition 1
is a version of the one-shot deviation principle.
Corollary 1 (the one-shot deviation principle for in￿nitely repeated games
extended with an extensive form correlation device). A pair (D;f) consist-
ing of an extensive form correlation device ((Mi)i2N;￿) and a strategy pro￿le
f = (f1;:::;fn); fi : H ￿ Mi ! 4(Ai); is a subgame perfect correlated equi-
librium of G1(￿) if and only if the one-shot deviation condition holds: no
player can gain by deviating from f in a single stage and conforming to f
thereafter.
Taking into account the importance of the concept of subgame perfect
13direct correlated equilibrium, let us describe some of its most essential el-
ements. An extensive form direct correlation device is an extensive form
correlation device D = ((Mi)i2N;￿) where Mi = Ai for all i 2 N: The obedi-
ent strategy for player i is a map fi from H￿Ai to Ai such that f(hk;ai) = ai
for all hk 2 H and all ai 2 Ai: An extensive form direct correlated equilib-
rium is just a map ￿ from H to 4(A) such that the obedient strategy pro￿le
is a Nash equilibrium of the induced extended game. An extensive form di-
rect correlated equilibrium ￿ of G1(￿) is called subgame perfect if ￿jhk is an
extensive form direct correlated equilibrium of G1(￿) for any hk 2 H: Let
Ui(￿jhk;￿) denote player i￿ s stage-k expected average discounted payo⁄to an
extensive form direct correlated equilibrium ￿ at hk:
Proposition 1 implies that the revelation principle holds for in￿nitely
repeated games with extensive form correlation devices.
Corollary 2 (the revelation principle for in￿nitely repeated games ex-
tended with an extensive form correlation device). Every subgame perfect
correlated equilibrium payo⁄ of G1(￿) can be achieved as a subgame perfect
direct correlated equilibrium payo⁄ of G1(￿):
Proof. Let (D;f) be a subgame perfect correlated equilibrium of G1(￿):
For any hk 2 H; (D0jhk f0jhk) is a correlated equilibrium of the game G0jhk(￿):
By the revelation principle for normal form games, the probability distrib-
ution ￿D0jhk;f0jhk on A induced by the correlated equilibrium (D0jhk f0jhk)
is a direct correlated equilibrium of G0jhk(￿): Consider ￿ : H ! 4(A);
￿(a j hk) = ￿D0jhk;f0jhk(a) for all hk 2 H. It follows from Proposition 1
that ￿ is a subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium. By construction,
the players￿expected payo⁄s to the subgame perfect correlated equilibrium
(D;f) coincide with those given by ￿. ￿
Note that well-known public randomization devices are not extensive form
correlation devices in the sense of the de￿nition we have provided. There are
two essential di⁄erences. First, a public randomization device sends publicly
observed messages chosen randomly according to a probability distribution
14at the beginning of each stage and is usually described by a sequence of
independent random variables ￿1;:::;￿T;:::, each uniformly distributed on
[0;1]: Second, the players use random outcomes of the variables to randomize
among continuation equilibria, which is possible because the notion of public
history is augmented with previously sent public messages, namely the public
history at stage k consists of all the action pro￿les played and the public
messages observed before stage k:
Direct public randomization devices were introduced by Myerson (1991),
who proved a version of the folk theorem for subgame perfect publicly corre-
lated equilibria of in￿nitely repeated games with discounting. It is important
to notice that, in our formalization, players receive only private messages
from an extensive form correlation device. Thus any information about the
messages sent before stage k is not common knowledge at the beginning
of stage k and can not be used without having to deal with a number of
theoretical complications.
The rest of the paper is devoted to studying the set of subgame perfect
correlated equilibrium payo⁄s of G1(￿). To start with, we prove that this
set is not empty.
Proposition 2. Every in￿nitely repeated game G1(￿) has a subgame
perfect correlated equilibrium.
Proof. As Hart and Schmeidler (1989) have shown, every ￿nite normal
form game has a correlated equilibrium. Let ￿￿ be a direct correlated equi-
librium of G and ￿1
￿ denote the direct extensive form correlated strategy of
G1(￿) de￿ned as follows:
￿
1
￿ (a j h
k) = ￿￿(a) for all a 2 A and all h
k 2 H:
By the one-shot deviation principle, it is enough to check that no player has
incentive to disobey at any hk 2 H and follow the device￿ s recommendations
thereafter if its recommendations to the players at all stages are randomly




￿ ;￿) = Ui(￿
1jh0
￿ ;￿) for all h
k 2 H;
and ￿￿ is a correlated equilibrium of G, no player can gain by disobeying at
any hk 2 H: ￿
As it is shown below, the set of subgame perfect correlated equilibrium
payo⁄s is not necessarily convex. Jumping to the conclusion that this solution
concept is ￿ awed is unreasonable since, in many in￿nitely repeated games,
the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payo⁄s is nonconvex as well (see, for
example, Sorin, 1986). Moreover, it has turned out that in￿nitely repeated
games extended with an extensive form correlation device have a recursive
structure and the techniques developed by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti
(1986, 1990) can be successfully applied in this case.
4 Characterization of the Set of Equilibrium
Payo⁄s
Let V denote the set of feasible and individually (not necessarily strictly)
rational payo⁄s of G, VS(￿) the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payo⁄s
of G1(￿), VC(￿) the set of subgame perfect correlated equilibrium payo⁄s
of G1(￿), VP(￿) the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payo⁄s of G1(￿)
extended with a public randomization device. Further on, we call VP(￿) the
set of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payo⁄s.
Every subgame perfect equilibrium strategy pro￿le of G1(￿) can be rep-
resented as a subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium of G1(￿): There-
fore, the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payo⁄s is a subset of the set of
subgame perfect correlated equilibrium payo⁄s.
Proposition 3. In G1(￿); every subgame perfect equilibrium payo⁄ is
a subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium payo⁄ :




Hk ! 4(Ai); be a subgame perfect
equilibrium strategy pro￿le of G1(￿). We de￿ne an extensive form direct












k) for all a
k 2 A and all h
k 2 H:
It is not di¢ cult to see that the one-shot deviation condition holds for this ex-
tensive form direct correlated strategy. Therefore, the strategy is a subgame
perfect direct correlated equilibrium. ￿
In the in￿nitely repeated prisoner￿ s dilemma games studied in Section 5,
VS(￿) is a proper subset of VC(￿): It is useful to note that the set of correlated
equilibria payo⁄s and the set of Nash equilibrium payo⁄s are identical for a
one-shot prisoner￿ s dilemma game.
We are now ready to present the main properties of VC(￿); the set of
subgame perfect correlated equilibrium payo⁄s of G1(￿). By Proposition 2,
VC(￿) is also the set of subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium payo⁄s.
Without loss of generality, we assume that any extensive form correlation
device added to G1(￿) is a direct device. Let M(￿) denote the set of sub-
game perfect direct correllated equilibrium strategies of G1(￿):If ￿ 2 M(￿);












VC(￿) = fv 2 R




;￿)) for some ￿ 2 M(￿)g:
Therefore, if v 2 VC(￿); there exist a probability distribution ￿ 2 4(A),
a function c from A to VC(￿) such that v =
P
a2A
￿(a)((1 ￿ ￿)u(a) + ￿c(a)),
17where u(a) , (u1(a);:::;un(a)): This observation is crucial to obtaining a
number of powerful characterizations of the set of subgame perfect correlated
equilibrium payo⁄s.
De￿nition. Given ￿ 2 (0;1), for any W ￿ Rn, a pair (￿;c), where ￿
is a probability distribution on A, c is a function from A to W, is called
admissible with respect to W if, for all ai 2 Ai; aj 2 Ainfaig; i 2 N;
X
a￿i2A￿i




￿(ai;a￿i)((1 ￿ ￿)ui(aj;a￿i) + ￿ci(aj;a￿i)):
For each set W ￿ Rn; we de￿ne
B￿(W) = fv 2 R
n : v =
X
a2A
￿(a)((1 ￿ ￿)u(a) + ￿c(a))
for some pair (￿;c) admissible w.r.t. Wg:
Any point from B￿(W) is called decomposable with respect to W. It is
obvious that VC(￿) ￿ B￿(VC(￿)): Following Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti
(1990), W ￿ V is self-generating if W ￿ B￿(W): Self-generation is a su¢ cient
condition for a subset of the set of feasible and individually rational payo⁄s
V to be a subset of the set of subgame perfect correlated equilibrium payo⁄s
VC(￿):
Proposition 4 (Self-Generation). If W is self-generating, then
B￿(W) ￿ VC(￿):
Proof. For each v 2 B￿(W); there exists a pair (￿0;c0) admissible w.r.t.
W such that v =
P
a02A
￿0(a0)((1 ￿ ￿)u(a0) + ￿c0(a0)): In its turn, each c0(a0);
a0 2 A can be represented as
P
a12A
￿1(a1 j a0)((1 ￿ ￿)u(a1) + ￿c1(a1 j a0));
where (￿1(￿ j a0);c1(￿ j a0)) is a pair admissible w.r.t. W. In this way,
it is possible to ￿nd a pair (￿k(￿ j hk);ck(￿ j hk)) admissible w.r.t. W for
18any possible history hk = fa0;:::;ak￿1g 2 H: Note that ￿k(￿ j hk) is a
correlated equilibrium of the game (N;(Ai)i2N;((1￿￿)ui(￿)+￿ck(￿ j hk)i2N).
It follows from Proposition 1 that the extensive form correlated strategy




k) for all a 2 A and all h
k 2 H;
is a subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium of G1(￿) yielding expected
discounted average payo⁄ v:￿
We now proceed to some properties of the set VC(￿):
Corollary 3. VC(￿) is the maximal element (by inclusion) of the collec-
tion ￿ of all subsets W of V such that W ￿ B￿(W):
Proof. Since VC(￿) ￿ B￿(VC(￿)), the collection ￿ is not empty. It is
partially ordered by the relation ￿ : It is not di¢ cult to see that any chain
that consists of elements of ￿ has an upper bound. By Zorn￿ s lemma, ￿ has a
maximal element, call it V (￿): By Proposition 4, V (￿) ￿ B￿(V (￿)) ￿ VC(￿):
Since V (￿) is the maximal element of ￿, VC(￿) is a subset of V (￿). Therefore,
V (￿) = VC(￿):￿
The maximality of VC(￿) is closely related to the fact that the set is a
￿xed point of B￿:
Corollary 4 (Factorization). VC(￿) = B￿(VC(￿)):
Proof. By de￿nition, VC(￿) ￿ B￿(VC(￿)). On the other hand,
B￿(VC(￿)) ￿ VC(￿) by Proposition 4, hence VC(￿) = B￿(VC(￿)):￿
It is often useful to remember that VC(￿) is a closed subset of V .
Proposition 5. VC(￿) is compact:
Proof. Let clVC(￿) denote the closure of VC(￿) and v￿ 2 clVC(￿):
Consider a sequence fvjg1
j=1;vj 2 VC(￿); converging to v￿. For each vj
there exists a pair (￿j;cj) admissible with respect to VC(￿) such that vj =
19P
a2A
￿j(a)((1￿￿)u(a)+￿cj(a)): For any a 2 A, the sequence f(￿j(a);cj(a))g1
j=1
is bounded, therefore it contains a converging subsequence. Since the set




nj=1converges to some (￿￿(a);c￿(a)) 2 R1￿Rn for any
a 2 A:
Without loss of generality, we denote the subsequence again by
f(￿j;cj)g1
j=1: It is not di¢ cult to see that
P
a2A
￿￿(a) = 1; and c￿(a) 2 clVC(￿)
for all a 2 A: By continuity we conclude that the pair (￿￿;c￿) is admissible
with respect to clVC(￿); and, therefore, clVC(￿) ￿ B￿(clVC(￿)): From the
maximal property of VC(￿); VC(￿) = clVC(￿): ￿
5 EXAMPLES
Adding an extensive form correlation device to an in￿nitely repeated pris-
oner￿ s dilemma game may lead to more e¢ cient outcomes than those that
may be achieved with the help of a public randomization device, and more-
over, the set of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payo⁄s
may be a proper subset of the set of subgame perfect correlated equilibrium
payo⁄s.
Example 1. The stage game is the following prisoner￿ s dilemma game:
Player 2
Actions 1 2
Player 1 1 1;1 ￿b;2
2 2;￿b 0;0
where b = 2
5. Following Stahl (1991), one can show that, if ￿ 2 [b
2; 1
2), the
set of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payo⁄s VP(￿) is the
triangle T with extreme points (0;2 ￿ b);(2 ￿ b;0); and (0;0): Note that
VS(￿) ￿ VP(￿) = T for any ￿ 2 [b
2; 1




2) such that T is a proper subset of VC(￿) for all ￿ 2 [￿
0; 1
2).




1+￿ ); and (0;0)
is self-generating (W ￿ B￿(W)). Proposition 4 implies that W is a subset
of VC(￿): The reduced normal form game corresponding to the continuation





1+￿ ) is as follows:
Player 2
Actions 1 2






Among the Nash equilibria of this game, there are the action pro￿les (1;2)




1+￿ )] ￿ VC(1
2): It is easy to
check that the points (
(1￿￿)b
￿ ; 2￿￿b
￿ ) and (2￿￿b
￿ ;
(1￿￿)b
￿ ) may be used as continu-
ations values since they belong to D for any ￿ 2 [1
5; 1
2). Below is the reduced










Player 1 1 1 ￿ ￿;1 ￿ ￿ 0;2 ￿ b
2 2 ￿ b;0 0;0
Since the set of Nash equilibria of this game includes the action pro￿les (1;2);








2 V nT that can be supported as
a subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium payo⁄. Let us take c =
(c11;c12;c21;c22); c11 = (v;v); c12 = (2 ￿ b;0); c21 = (0;2 ￿ b); c22 = (0;0):
For the sake of simplicity, we will choose a probability distribution ￿ =
(￿11;￿12;￿21;￿22) on the set of action pro￿les such that ￿12 = ￿21; ￿22 = 0:
The game is symmetric, so let us study it from player 1￿ s point of view. The
fact that a point (v;v) can be supported by a pair (￿;c) means
21v = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿11 + (2 ￿ b)￿12) + ￿(￿11v + (2 ￿ b)￿12) (3)
and the following two incentive constraints hold:
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿11 ￿ ￿12b) + ￿(￿11v + (2 ￿ b)￿12) ￿ 2￿11(1 ￿ ￿);
2(1 ￿ ￿)￿12 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿12 + ￿￿12v:
It follows from the ￿rst incentive constraint and (3) that v ￿ 2(1￿￿)(1￿￿12):
At the same time, (3) can be rewritten as follows:
v = v(b;￿;￿12) =




1 ￿ ￿ + 2￿￿12
:
Hence the ￿rst incentive constraint holds if ￿ and ￿12 are such that
1 ￿
b￿12
1 ￿ ￿ + 2￿￿12






> 1 ￿ ￿12;
then, by continuity, the ￿rst incentive constraint holds if ￿12 6= 0 and ￿ is
close enough to 1
2: In other words, for any ￿12 > 0; there exists a ￿(￿12) < 1
2
such that the ￿rst incentive constraint holds for all ￿ 2 [￿(￿12); 1
2). The
second incentive constraint is tantamount to the following inequality v ￿
1￿￿
￿ : This inequality obviously holds if ￿ < 1
2. It is not di¢ cult to see that
v(b;￿(￿12);￿12) approaches 1 as ￿12 goes to 0:
Adding a public randomization device to an in￿nitely repeated game is
accompanied by rede￿ning the notion of history, with the stage-k public
history including not only the sequence of action pro￿les (a0;a1;:::ak￿1)
chosen in previous stages but also the sequence of public messages sent by
22the device in previous stages. As a result, it is not di¢ cult to ￿nd an example
where the set of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payo⁄s
strictly contains the set of subgame perfect correlated equilibrium payo⁄s.
In example 2, the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payo⁄s of an in￿-
nitely repeated prisoner￿ s dilemma game is a proper subset of the set of its
subgame perfect correlated equilibrium payo⁄s. The latter set is not con-
vex and, in its turn, is a proper subset of the set of subgame perfect public
randomization equilibrium payo⁄s.
Example 2. We study an in￿nitely repeated prisoner￿ s dilemma game
with observable actions for a ￿xed discount factor (￿ = 1




Player 1 1 1,1 -1,2
2 2,-1 0,0
Following Sorin (1986), one can check that the set of subgame perfect
equilibrium payo⁄s of this game consists of the square A with extreme points
(0;1); (1;0); (1;1); (0;0) and the two line segments [(1;0);(3
2;0)]; [(0;1);(0; 3
2)].
Let us show that, along with the square, VC(1
2) includes the triangle with ex-
treme points (3
2;0); (0;0); (0; 3
2):
By Proposition 3, the square A is contained in VC(1
2): For the continuation
value function c = (c11;c12;c21;c22), c11 = c12 = c21 = (1;1);c22 = (0;0); the
corresponding normal form game is as follows:
Player 2
Actions 1 2




The set of Nash equilibria of this game includes the action pro￿les (1;2);
(2;1); and (2;2): Therefore, any point of the convex hull of (0; 3
2);(0;0);(3
2;0)
is a correlated equlibrium payo⁄ of the game (see Aumann, 1974). Using
23Proposition 4, we conclude that the triangle with extreme points (3
2;0);(0;0);
(0; 3
2) is contained in VC(1
2):
In contrast to the fact that the set of correlated equilibrium payo⁄s (see
Forges, 1986) is usually convex, the set of payo⁄s given by subgame perfect
correlated equilibrium strategies is not necessarily convex. Let us show that
the set VC(1
2) is not convex.
For any point v 2 VC(1
2), there exists a pair (￿;c), ￿ = (￿11;￿12;￿21;￿22) 2
4(A), c = (c11;c12;c21;c22);clm 2 VC(1






































and the following incentive constraints hold
for player 1:
￿11(1 + c1
11) + ￿12(￿1 + c1





22 ￿ ￿21(1 + c1




11) + ￿21(￿1 + c2





22 ￿ ￿12(1 + c2
21) + ￿22(￿1 + c2
21):
Let us show that any point of the relative interior of the interval
[(0; 3
2);(1;1)] does not belong to VC(1






;p) = fv 2 VC(
1
2





consists of two points, namely (0; 3
2) and (1;1), where (v;p) is the inner
product of v and p; ￿
￿(￿ j VC(1






the support function of VC(1



















24for any continuation values c21 and c22 chosen from V , we conclude that if
v 2 VC(1
2;p), then the corresponding ￿ = (￿11;￿12;￿21;￿22) 2 4(A) is such
that ￿21 = ￿22 = 0: Assume that there exists a v 2 VC(1
2) \ ((0; 3
2);(1;1))
that can be decomposed with the help of an addmissible pair (￿;c). Since v
is di⁄erent from (0; 3





2)): Taking also into account the fact that
c12 2 VC(1
2) ￿ V , we conclude that c12 2 [(0; 3
2);(1;1)]; and c2
12 ￿ 1: Since
￿21 = 0; the ￿rst incentive constraint for player 2 does not hold. Therefore,
the set VC(1
2;p) consists of two points only.
This nonconvexity result is di⁄erent from that observed when the game
is extended with a public randomization device. In the latter case, the set of
equilibrium payo⁄s is the convex hull of VS(1
2) and, therefore, coincides with
the set of feasible and individually rational payo⁄s V .
If messages are public, players can condition their play both on the his-
tory of action pro￿les chosen in previous stages and on the history of past
public messages. For example, following Myerson (1991, p. 332), a direct





to 4(A): For any k and any (a0;:::;ak￿1;c0;:::;ck￿1) 2 A2k￿2; the number
￿(ck j a0;:::;ak￿1;c0;:::;ck￿1) denotes the conditional probability that ck
would be the action pro￿le publicly recommended to the players by the de-
vice, if the history of recommendations in previous stages was (c0;:::;ck￿1)
and if the history of action pro￿les chosen was (a0;:::;ak￿1): In this case, the
public history at the beginning of stage k is (a0;:::;ak￿1;c0;:::;ck￿1): Let





4) can be supported in
the presence of a public randomization device and why it can not be achieved
with an extensive form correlation device. The payo⁄s (1;1) and (0; 3
2) are
subgame perfect equilibrium ones. To get the payo⁄(1;1) (the payo⁄(0; 3
2));
the players play the action pro￿le (1;1) (the action pro￿le (1;2)) at stage 0
and choose their future play so that to achieve the following continuation val-
ues c11 = (1;1); c12 = c21 = c22 = (0;0) (c11 = c21 = c22 = (0;0);c12 = (1;1)):
25The reasoning provided in the proof of Proposition 3 can be employed to
determine the corresponding subgame perfect publicly correlated equilibria
￿(1;1) and ￿(0; 3
2) with the expected payo⁄s (1;1) and (0; 3
2); respectively. It
should be noted that both ￿(1;1) and ￿(0; 3
2) are functions from H to 4(A) by
construction since any information about past recommendations is not used
by these devices. The payo⁄ (1
2; 5
4) is obtained if a public randomization
device selects its recommendation at stage 0 according to the distribution
￿((1;1) j ?) = ￿((1;2) j ?) = 1
2 and acts as the device ￿(1;1) if the rec-
ommended action pro￿le is (1;1) or as the device ￿(0; 3
2) if the recommended
action pro￿le is (1;2). It is possible since the information about past rec-
ommendations is part of the public history at the beginning of each stage,
which is not the case when a correlation device sends players only private
messages. Note that, at stage 0, the devices ￿(1;1) and ￿(0; 3
2) recommend the
players play the action pro￿les (1;1) and (1;2); respectively.
To introduce public randomization e⁄ects into the model with an exten-
sive form direct correlation device, it is enough to assume that the device
also sends a public message informing the players about the recommended
action pro￿le at the end of each stage (after the players have chosen their
actions) and rede￿ne the stage-k public history as the sequence of action
pro￿les chosen in previous stages and past public messages. Such a device
not only can coordinate players￿actions by sending them private messages
at the beginning of each stage but also can be used for randomizing among
continuation values.
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